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FEDERAL CORPORATE CHARTERING FOR BIG BUSINESS:
AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME?*
JOEL F. HENNING**
MERICA WAS born in resistance to the unbridled power
of government. Thus the Constitution principally addressed
itself to limiting, checking and balancing government power.
In 1789 there was no big business. Corporations, when chartered
at all, were chartered individually by state legislative act, usually to
accomplish specific public purposes, such as building bridges or
highways.'
The Industrial Revolution created a demand for corporate struc-
tures to facilitate the accumulation and utilization of capital, but
the process of securing a charter by special legislation was cum-
bersome, expensive and occasionally corrupt.' The states respond-
ed by passing general incorporation laws providing virtually auto-
matic corporate chartering.' From that point, nature took its course
until America's super-corporations now rival, if not exceed, any
government in the world in power and influence. For example,
the two hundred biggest companies control about two-thirds of U.S.
manufacturing assets. One hundred seventy corporate giants reported
sales of one billion dollars or more in 1970. Eighteen had sales of
more than four billion dollars. Four corporations earned more than
one billion dollars in profit.4
* The editors of this journal asked me to elaborate on a short article of mine
published in the Washington Post proposing a dual system of corporate chartering.
The subject is one that will, 1 hope, increasingly attract the attention of legal
scholars as well as policy makers.
** MR. HENNING is presently a Fellow at the Adlai Stevenson Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, Chicago, Illinois. He is a contributing author to Corporate Power
in America (Nader ed.) which will be published this year. Mr. Henning is a graduate
of Harvard University and Harvard Law School (1964) and a member of the
Illinois Bar.
1. A. BERLE JR., and G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY, 218-30 (1932).
2. J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, 133-39 (1970).
3. A. BERLE and G. MEANS, supra note 1, at 135-37.
4. Figures quoted from FORBES, Annual Directory Issue, May 15, 1971.
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I. MISDIRECTED EFFORTS TO CONTROL CORPORATE POWER
The manner in which these super-corporations are established,
the relative rights and duties of those participating in them (direc-
tors, officers, stockholders, creditors, employees, customers, etc.)
and the delimitation of their powers vis-it-vis the external world
are obviously matters of public importance. However, the disper-
sal among fifty states of responsibility to make the rules has dis-
couraged initiative for reform. On the contrary, a disagreeable
change in one state's laws still will cause corporate managers to re-
incorporate in a more accommodating state. Currently, Delaware
is the most alluring jurisdiction.
The sovereign state of Delaware is in the business of selling its corporation law.
This is profitable business, for corporation law is a good commodity to sell ...
The consumers of this commodity are corporations, and . . . Delaware, like any
other good businessman, tries to give the consumer what he wants. In fact, those
who will buy the product are not only consulted about their preferences, but are
also allowed to design the product and run the factory. 5
State incorporation law has clearly failed to control corporate
power. Because of the venal scramble for corporate business at
the state level, this failure can only be corrected at the federal level.
But the federal record on economic regulation is hardly better than
that of the states. Critics will legitimately ask if any real benefit
can be achieved by adding even more tentacles to the federal octo-
pus. There are already an ever-expanding number of federal laws
affecting corporations. Some attempt to preserve or restore free
market conditions, others attempt to impose public policy through
direct regulation of enterprises. Neither category has been an un-
qualified success.
In the anti-trust field, eighty years of enforcement under the Sher-
man Act, the Clayton Act and their progeny has proceeded simul-
taneously with startling increases in industrial concentration.'
While the anti-trust laws have worked reasonably well in the areas
of price-fixing, bid-rigging and market allocation,7 they have failed
5. Note, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967,
117 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (1969).
6. R. BARBER, THE AMERICAN CORPORATION, 173-74 (1970). M. GREEN et al,
THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM, A NADER TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTI-
TRUST ENFORCEMENT (1971); cf. Posner, Nader on Anti-Trust, NEw REPUBLIC,
June 26, 1971.
7, R. BARBER, THE AMERICAN CORPORATION, at 172-73 (1970).
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to significantly deter the extraordinary concentration of American
industry. As Professor Barber has written:
Under the very nose of anti-trust, U. S. industry has been thoroughly oligopolized
and the share of productive wealth held by a relatively very few corporations . . .
has continued to increase. 8
In the area of conglomerate mergers, the record of anti-trust en-
forcement is even more dismal. Recent revelations concerning the
cases involving ITT suggest that rigorous conglomerate anti-trust
enforcement is subject at best to strong political influence, at worst
to outright bribery.'
The regulatory agencies have been at least as disappointing in
performance as federal anti-trust policy. 0 In many cases they
have been set adrift with fuzzy delegations of authority to regulate
complex industries "in the public interest."'" They are subject to
pressures from the White House, from Congress and from the in-
dustries they are supposed to regulate. They have not, as yet, found
an effective means of systematically channelling the voice of the
public into their decision-making processes. In addition, the various
agencies are often in conflict with one another. Our federal highway
subsidy program, for example, was a principal cause of the decline
in railroad service.' 2
Why has government regulation of corporations largely failed?
The final answer to this question must await the judgment of eco-
nomic and political historians in generations to come. Those in-
terested in public policy, however, must attempt to at least find
some tentative answers to this question. Perhaps the basic prob-
lem is that we have misconceived the nature of the large corpora-
tion. This problem was clear to Professors Berle and Means forty
years ago when they published their seminal work, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property.3 The corporation, they pointed
out:
8. Id. at 175.
9. See, e.g., ITT's Battle to Keep Hartford, BUSINESS WEEK, March 11, 1972,
at 32-33.
10. See, e.g., L. KOHLMEIER, JR., THE REGULATORS (1969).
11. T. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 128-56 (1969).
12. J. DAUGHEN and P. BINZEN, THE WRECK OF THE PENN CENTRAL, 209 (1971).
13. A. BERLE and G. MEANS, supra note 1.
19721
918 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXI:915
[c] alls for analysis, not in terms of business enterprise but in terms of social organi-
zation. On the one hand, it involves a concentration of power in the economic field
comparable to the concentration of religious power in the medieval church or of
political power in the national state. On the other hand, it involves the interrelation
of a wide diversity of economic interests-those of the 'owners' who supply capital,
those of the workers who 'create,' those of the consumers who give value to the
products of enterprise, and above all those of the control who wield power. 1 4
Berle and Means saw the inherent conflict that surrounds such en-
terprises. Those who wield the power desire to preserve and en-
large it. At the same time, however, those who are affected by
these powerful institutions increasingly demand that corporate pow-
er be used for the benefit of all concerned. This phenomenon ap-
plies equally to religious, political and economic institutions. In the
last few decades the growth of the modern corporation has reached
the point where Professor Berle was prompted to state that, "some
of these corporations are units which can be thought of only in
somewhat the way we have heretofore thought of nations."1
However, we have not attempted to control the super-corpora-
tions in the same way that we have controlled the power of govern-
ment. Through anti-trust policy and the regulatory agencies fed-
eral regulation of corporations has proceeded by a series of attempts
to prohibit specific acts. A very different approach to the control
of governmental power was taken by the founding fathers in draft-
ing the U.S. Constitution. They chose to reorganize, regularize and
disburse government power rather than to prohibit specific acts. 6
II. THE ALTERNATIVE: A NEW LAW OF CORPORATIONS
It would therefore seem sensible to attempt the creation of a new
"law of corporations." Such a law, as Professors Berle and Means
suggested, "might well be considered as a potential constitutional
law for the new economic state. .. ."I A federal business cor-
poration act might be the appropriate vehicle for this new insti-
tutional approach to the problem of corporate power. It would be
a means of controlling the power of big business by establishing
14. A. BERLE and G. MEANS, supra note 1, at 352-53.
15. A. BERLE, JR., EcONOMIC POWER AND THE FREE SOCIETY, 15 (1957).
16. This analysis was developed in an interesting and important essay by Chayes,
The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN
MODERN SOCIETY, p. 25-45 (E.S. Mason ed. 1959).
17. A. BERLE and G. MEANS, supra note 1, at 357.
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and enforcing a reasonable set of corporate institutional arrange-
ments. Without minimizing the enormous conceptual challenge that
such a project suggests, the remainder of this essay is an attempt
to touch on some of the basic issues that might be involved.
The notion of federal chartering is not new. At the Constitu-
tional Convention James Madison proposed unsuccessfully that Con-
gress be empowered to charter corporations. Presidents Roosevelt,
Taft, and Wilson all advocated federal chartering or licensing.
President Taft wrote:
No other method can be suggested which offers federal protection on the one hand,
and close federal supervision on the other, of these great organizations that are in
fact federal because they are as wide as the country and are entirely unlimited in
their business by State lines.18
The Depression brought renewed interest in the concept from Sen-
ators Borah and O'Mahoney, but after extensive hearings their pro-
posals were defeated. 19
Senator O'Mahoney remained convinced that such legislation was
needed. In his final statement on the matter he said:
It is idle to think that huge collective institutions which carry on our modern
business can continue to operate without more definite responsibility toward all the
people of the Nation than they now have. To do this it will be necessary in my
judgment, to have a national chartering system for all national corporations .... 20
The drafting of a federal business corporation act will profoundly
challenge the skill of lawyers and legislators. Complex issues must
be resolved such as the relative fiduciary obligations of inside and
outside directors, shareholder rights, employee rights, accounting
standards,. and a host of others. This is not the place to delve into
substantive details of the proposed legislation. But a few possible
features of the legislation are worth brief discussion: (A) a new
approach to anti-trust policy, (B) a comprehensive system of dis-
closures and (C) a limited federal interest, pursuant to which only
the biggest corporations would require federal charters.
18. Reuschlein, Federalization-Design for Corporate Reform in a National
Economy, 91 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 106, n.74 (1942). See pages 106-7 for brief review
of history of attempts to implement federal incorporation schemes.
19. Id. at 107.
20. , Quoted by Ralph Nader, The Case for Federal Incorporation. Statement
presented at Conference on Corporate Accountability, Washington, D.C., October
30-31, 1971, at 9.
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A. INDUSTRIAL DE-CONCENTRATION
Industrial de-concentration can be approached in ways other than
after-the-fact litigation based on the existing anti-trust laws. If a
workable formula can be developed, the federal business corpora-
tion act could include anti-trust standards that must be met prior
to the issuance or renewal of a federal charter. The act may, for
example, require that no corporation be chartered to serve more
than twelve percent of any relevant market, as recommended by the
Neal Task Force Study commissioned by President Johnson.21 The
act might also prohibit stock or asset acquisitions, except under ap-
propriate circumstances. It should certainly restrict anti-competi-
tive corporate interlocks.
B. DISCLOSURE
In order to make rational policy in domestic and international
affairs we support several intelligence agencies, at least one of which,
the CIA, is reputed to have a budget larger than that of the State
Department. But we have compelled our economic regulators to
grope blindly with little systematic access to relevant data. If a free
market economy is to work, information must be freely available.
Businessmen tend to turn this axiom on its head, defending corpo-
rate secrecy as the fundamental requisite of free enterprise. How-
ever, when a company expands into divisions, subdivisions, and
especially when it conglomerates, its public reporting becomes less
and less useful to investors, suppliers, customers and potential com-
petitors. It goes without saying that consumers, the media, scholars
and the government itself are equally at a loss to know what corpo-
rations are doing and planning.
In short, we do not know much about corporations. Therefore,
the act should require substantially more financial disclosure, prod-
uct information and social data from corporations. The earnings
of separate products and subsidiaries, now largely hidden, the re-
sults of product safety and durability tests, the ingredients of food
and beverages, the racial composition of work forces, the costs of
pollution, job dislocations, research and development, etc., all can
be disclosed without critically impairing the honest competitive ad-
21. N.Y. Times, May 22, 1969, at 1, col. 7.
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vantages of one business over another. The SEC appears to be
moving in the same direction within its limited jurisdiction. 2
A comprehensive set of disclosure requirements, reaching into all
aspects of corporate operations will make it possible for the govern-
ment and the public to make rational decisions in all aspects of
corporate enterprise.23 In the course of time, policymakers will
know considerably more about corporations and will thus be in a
substantially improved position to determine what areas of enter-
prise should be left free of any political interference, what areas
now constrained by regulation should be freed, and vice-versa.
C. LIMITED FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT
The political problems of achieving a federal business corporation
act, as well as some of the practical problems, can perhaps be mini-
mized by attempting to "federalize" only the very biggest corpora-
tions. This approach seems better suited to our federal system of
government, more appealing to those who believe activities with
local impact should be subject to local control, and more politically
manageable in the short run. It is modeled in part on our dual
banking system, under which banks can operate under state or fed-
eral charter. Obviously, the dual banking system is far from perfect
and has from time to time been subject to intense criticism. It has
not prevented panics, depressions, recessions and inflations. It de-
veloped through a series of historical accidents,24 but it neverthe-
less provides an interesting model.
The smallest of our corporations may have a relatively confined
impact on their local communities. The biggest, however, are truly
national and international institutions. Such a system would mean
that those wishing to start a new and modest venture would not
have to travel to the formidable bureaucracy of Washington. How-
ever, enterprises with profound national and international impact
would be required to conform to structural and institutional stand-
22. Its Getting Tougher to Lie, N.Y. Times, March 26, 1972, (Financial Sec-
tion) at 1.
23. See, e.g., Mueller, Corporate Disclosure and Federal Incorporation. State-
ment presented at Conference on Corporate Accountability, Washington, D.C., Octo-
ber 30-31, 1971.
24. T. THOMPSON, CHECKS AND BALANCES, A STUDY OF THE DUAL BANKING SYS-
TEM IN AMERICA (1962); W. BROWN, THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM IN THE U.S.
(1968).
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ards developed to meet the special problems that their size and
power generate.
A dual system would reflect continued faith in federalism and in
the power and ability of local communities to control activities of
local impact. It would prevent the creation of another gargantuan
federal bureaucracy that would have little chance of effective opera-
tion because of its sheer size. It would seem as absurd for the
federal government to attempt control of a corporation with assets
of one million dollars or less as for the federal government not to con-
trol a corporation with assets of one billion dollars or more. Federal
anti-trust, securities, trade, consumer and environmental protection
laws would continue to apply to all corporations regardless of their
incorporation under state or federal jurisdiction. Conversely, state
and local laws and taxes would still be imposed upon the local opera-
tions of national corporations.
Perhaps, therefore, national franchises in general need be re-
quired only of the two hundred largest industrial corporations,
which alone control sixty percent of our manufacturing assets.25 In
addition, however, a national franchise should be required of a
smaller corporation if it wishes to do a significant amount of busi-
ness with the federal government, to operate subsidiaries or facto-
ries in foreign countries, or to engage in certain industries where
there is an overriding federal interest, such as energy and interstate
transportation.
The dual system of corporate chartering would be necessarily
different from banking in at least two respects. First, regardless
of size, banks may elect to operate under state charter. At least
for the five hundred largest industrial corporations, national char-
ters must be required if the dual system is to work in the corporate
context. The second difference has to do with tenure of national
charters. National banking charters are perpetual. National cor-
porate charters should extend for a limited number of years and
should be renewable upon a showing of fiscal and social responsibil-
ity. One would suppose that a company which, lost its right to
federal incorporation could apply for a state charter. Of course,
a large industrial corporation would have to split into many small
25. R. BARBER, supra note 7, at 21.
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units to avoid the requirement of a national charter for corpora-
tions of substantial size.
The principle of rigorous external examination and supervision,
now firmly embedded in the banking community, ought to be trans-
ferable to the corporate community. Frequent external examina-
tion of national corporations by the federal government might even
influence the states, and similar examinations would be instituted
in the state segment of the dual system. This appears to have oc-
curred in the banking community, where state banks caused their
home states to institute supervisory systems comparable to that for
federal banks. The public may feel insecure in dealing with cor-
porations chartered by the states if they were not as carefully ex-
amined and audited as national corporations. There is no reason
why such audit must be confined to the historical indices of success
and failure. It could involve examination of a corporation's respon-
sibilities to hire and promote members of minority communities, to
refrain from polluting the environment and to manufacture socially
useful products.
Obviously, action to neutralize corporate political power must
precede fundamental reforms in corporate law and regulation, such
as the one under discussion. It would be naive to minimize the
difficulty of rescuing politics from the dominance of business.2 6
The process may have modestly begun, however, with the first tenta-
tive steps now being taken toward election reform.17  If virtually
all campaign costs were limited and subsidized by the federal gov-
ernment, the influence of wealth on politics would not be eliminated,
but it might sufficiently be reduced to permit growing public in-
terest in consumer and environmental issues to compete with the
interests of business for the attention of our politicians.
III. PRAGMATIC ALTERNATIVES TO THE FUNDAMENTAL
APPROACH
Political feasibility notwithstanding, there are those who reject a
fundamental, structural approach to corporate reform, on the ground
26. M. MINTZ & J. COHEN, AMERICA, INC. (1971).
27. The Wall Street Journal, January 20, 1972, at 2, col. 1. The bill imposes
limits on television, radio and newspaper advertising by candidates for federal of-
fices. It also requires disclosure of contributors' names when contributions exceed
one hundred dollars.
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that better alternatives exist. Some men who have held high office
in business and government believe the better alternative is to sur-
render society to the corporation. George Ball has written:
While the structure of the multinational corporation is a modern concept, designed
to meet the requirements of a modem age, the nation state is a very old-fashioned
idea and badly adapted to serve the needs of our present complex world. 28
Others are equally prepared to surrender to the managers of the
conquering corporations but prudently throw themselves upon their
mercy, pleading for "corporate social responsibility." In the ab-
sence of effective political statesmanship, they urge business mana-
gers to assume economic statesmanship, to balance the interests of
all corporate constituencies and the general public, and to operate
their enterprises with the public interest in mind. These suppliants
ignore Lord Acton's rule concerning power in the hands of unac-
countable, self-perpetuating rulers. They also conveniently over-
look the palpable evidence of corporate irresponsibility in our air,
water, and food, on our highways, railroads and television sets, and
in our sacked and gradually abandoned cities. 29
Still other spokesmen acknowledge the ascendancy of the corpo-
ration over the state, but would transform the corporate autocracies
and oligopolies into democratic political institutions. To these
idealists still cherishing their high school civics, the problem is sim-
ple: If the old social contract with government has not been ful-
filled, enter into a new one with the super-corporations. What
could be more American? It's as simple as signing a new football
coach. How ironic that those who caution against simple-minded
attempts to impose our very particular democratic framework on
other nation states, as in Vietnam, see no problem in imposing it
on economic enterprises with values and goals at least as remote.
Well-intentioned, (as always) these missionaries refuse to believe
that the genius of American political democracy is not, like a Mc-
Donald's hamburger franchise, capable of flourishing anywhere.3 0
28. Ball, The Promise of the Multinational Corporation, FORTUNE, June, 1967,
at 80.
29. Henning, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Shell Game for the '70's? in
CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA, (M. Green ed. scheduled for publication in fall,
1972).
30. Henning, Reforming the Corporations Is Not Enough, Washington Post,
August 29, 1971, at 85.
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There is another group that sees the problem merely as one of
transferring ownership to the public sector. Ownership, alas, is not
the fundamental problem. Public ownership can result in a range
of systems from state capitalism to decentralized socialism. Ob-
viously, America's current level of economic concentration suggests
that the former is more likely to result from total state control.
Merely changing ownership will not result in an equitable and so-
cially salubrious distribution of corporate resources. The problem
is not ownership but accountability. Soviet lakes are polluted, too.
Eliminating what remains of our market economy would require
the substitution of planning, which has not been enormously suc-
cessful anywhere and has in some instances been a fiasco. Goals
seem to be reached most often in planned economies when they
have been set by industrial managers, based on the narrow interests
of their enterprises, a system only slightly different from our present
one.
81
Others concede the dangers of statism and therefore propose dis-
membering, smashing, atomizing the economy-doing for ourselves
what Morgenthau proposed we do for Germany after World War
II. This is a hopeless vision. It would not conceivably work un-
less the entire world agreed to return to a state of pre-industrial
nature. No doubt, then, the whole thing would begin all over
again.
IV. CONCLUSION
Finally, many reject a fundamental approach to corporate re-
form, alleging that such reforms are anti-capitalist, anti-profit, an-
ti-American. There is no way to avoid such criticism, but it may,
nevertheless, be useful to remind these critics that Germany has ex-
perienced the most dramatic economic development, largely within
its private sector, while deliberately and thoroughly reforming its
corporate law. Violent political developments have provided Ger-
man reformers the opportunity to propose substantial changes,
many of which have been enacted into law. 2 Perhaps we can ac-
complish as much here in a more peaceful and humane context.
31. S. COHEN, MODERN CAPITALIST PLANNING: THE FRENCH MODEL (1969).
32. Vagts, Reforming the 'Modern' Corporation: Perspectives from the German,
80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 25 (1966).
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